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Summary
Taking care of oneself is increasingly interpreted as taking care of one’s brain. 
Apart from drugs like antidepressants or ADHD-medicines, there are many more 
options to stimulate the brain. Brain products vary from books, food, soft-drinks, 
puzzles, toys, and games to – the topic of this dissertation –brain devices. Without 
undergoing any surgery, and without seeing a doctor, people can, for example, try 
to change their brain frequencies with light and sound machines. They can also use 
devices that work with electric or magnetic stimulation, like Cranial Electrotherapy 
Stimulation, transcranial Direct Current Stimulation, or Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation. Or they can try to change their brain waves with a neurofeedback 
device that provides feedback whenever their brain produces the intended 
brain wave activity, for example, in the form of the movement of a racing car or 
a Pac-Man on a computer screen. These techniques are promoted for various 
psychotherapeutic uses as well as for self-enhancement, and sometimes also for 
spiritual purposes and mind-altering effects. They can be bought on the Internet, 
used in brain clinics, or people can try to build their own brain machines.
 Using a brain device to cure or improve oneself can be described as a 
contemporary ‘technology of the self’, an expression Michel Foucault used to 
refer to those techniques that ‘permit individuals to effect by their own means or 
with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and 
souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order 
to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 18). Different techniques, Foucault explained, are based on 
different forms of care and constitute different kinds of selves (Foucault, 1984a, 
1988). People can work on themselves, for example, by taking antidepressants, 
seeing a psychoanalyst, or confessing one’s sins – and hence they will  perceive 
themselves as persons with chemical unbalances, repressed sexual desires, or 
struggles with the devil, which are basically three different ways of being oneself. 
Following this idea of Foucault, this dissertation presents an ethnographical, 
historical and theoretical exploration of the mode of subjectivity that is constituted 
when people use a brain device to change themselves.
 The first chapter gives an overview of the historical and contemporary 
uses of several brain technologies of the self, and analyzes why therapeutic brain 
devices do not have much scientific credibility yet. Following Ashmore et al. 
(2005), I argue that the scientific reliability of (therapeutic) effects partly depend 
on how findings are demonstrated, and for what public. Light and sound machines, 
for example, were often demonstrated with impressive histories – starting in 
prehistoric times, referring to recognizable and reproducible experiments, and full 
of famous spokespersons – but they were especially promoted as technologies 
for self-experimentation, and hence not so well presented in a scientific (public) 
domain. Electric and magnetic brain devices (like transcranial magnetic stimulation 
or transcranial direct current stimulation) are well demonstrated – with impressive 
histories, theatrical performances, and a professional demarcation policy – but 
representatives still have problems defending the therapeutic efficacy of these 
devices against skepticism, and hence attaining scientific credibility. Neurofeedback 
was historically promoted as both a scientific and a spiritual practice and until today 
experts have problems translating their therapeutic findings into experimental 
settings, and hence to transfer their results from a personal (spiritual and self-help) 
into a scientific (public and polemic) domain.
 The first chapter analyzes why therapeutic brain devices do not have 
much scientific credibility yet, but the second chapter makes clear that this lack of 
approval does not mean that these devices do not have effects. My ethnographic 
research among clients and practitioners of neurofeedback shows that this therapy 
can change people’s notion of themselves. Trying to change your brain activity with 
the purpose of improving yourself suggests that this self is, or is in, the brain. When 
explaining their actions, however, users make a clear distinction between their 
selves and their brains, with statements such as: ‘It seems that at the moment you 
start focusing, your brain interrupts.’ Apparently, people start doing neurofeedback 
because they want to improve themselves, but to react to the feedback of their 
brains they have to distance their selves from their brains. In other words, the self is 
extended with the brain instead of coinciding with it.
 Besides a self and a brain, other entities can also be identified. 
Neurofeedback users sometimes designate their subconscious, their will power, the 
computer, or the practitioner as the actor that trains their brain. When explaining 
their problems, they refer to various brain related entities like ‘alpha and theta 
things’ or ‘yellow spot’. In addition to these brain-related entities, users involve 
their lives and psychology with statements like ‘it is my life that made me quiet’. 
They describe themselves and the neurofeedback process in a rather computerized 
way (‘my system resets itself’), and they often combine this materialistic view with 
spiritual practices like yoga or meditation. That is to say, users of neurofeedback 
constitute a new way of being themselves. This self can be described as an 
extended or ‘layered’ self made up of all kinds of entities that emerged in the 
neurofeedback process.
 This change of the self should not be considered as only a matter of 
perception. According to neurofeedback users, the confrontation with the biological 
equivalent of their behavior gave them, for example, the experience of loss (‘I had 
always thought I was controlled by myself’); of fear (‘a bio-organic robot’); and of 
relief (‘you lack a certain substance in your brain’). Some users encourage their 
friends or family members to do neurofeedback too. They often claim that they 
would prefer resuming sessions if their problems returned, and sometimes, clients 
buy the equipment to train themselves (or their relatives), or to set up their own 
clinics. That is to say, doing neurofeedback does not only change the way people 
see themselves, their problems and their responsibility, it also changes their 
behavior, their relationships and the way they handle new problems. The new way 
of seeing themselves because of the neurofeedback has created a new way of being 
themselves. It is important to stress this ontological change since it demonstrates 
the effects of neurofeedback: irrespective of the clinical results, the effect of 
neurofeedback is very clear in the sense that it creates a new way of being oneself.
 To understand how neurofeedback users constitute a new way of being, 
it is also necessary to analyze how other actors help them creating this mode of 
self. As could already be observed in the interviews with users, ‘the others’ are 
not only humans (practitioners, scientists, or relatives), but also non-humans 
(computers, brain maps, games). Hence, the third chapter is based on the work 
of the sociologist of science Andrew Pickering who describes scientific practices 
as dances of agency between humans and non-humans. I show that not only the 
act of doing neurofeedback – trying to control your brain waves, for example by 
effecting a movement in a computer game – can be described as a dance of agency, 
but that the whole process involves various actors.
 To become clients, people first have to be aware of their problems, their 
brains, and the ‘solution’. Actors varying from relatives, psychiatrists, psychological 
tests, brain maps, neurofeedback practitioners, metaphors and success stories are 
involved in this awareness process. During the therapy, practitioners use tools like 
footstools, neurofeedback teddy bears, or movies to keep their client’s attention. 
They do not only work with their client’s brains, but also have to calm down 
their minds and posture their bodies. Moreover, when questioning practitioners 
about the neurofeedback process many more actors become involved, while it 
is not always clear who or what is the leading agent. Practitioners are not always 
the experts because they sometimes simply lack the knowledge, protocols do 
not always work, qEEGs can behave unpredictably, and computers sometimes 
appear to be the actors that define the training. As a result of these uncertainties, 
practitioners more or less experiment on their clients to find out which protocol, 
method or frequency range works for which client. That is to say, neurofeedback 
can be described as a process of trial-and-error-tinkering (Pickering 1995), in which 
human and non-human actors perform a dance of agency, without following a clear 
choreography.
 The envisioned result of this all is a restored or improved client. To 
recognize this improvement, however, practitioners often have to help their clients 
by pointing out what is changed, not only in their client’s brains, but mostly in their 
feelings, performances or lives. For this, they appeal to many actors. Actors varying 
from parents, brain maps, to specific results can make the client conscious of his 
or her changed state, which can be found ‘inside’ of the brain (normalized brain 
waves), mind (a reduction of stress), body (physical experiences), or somewhere 
outside in the world (tests, performances). Another kind of result, however, is again 
a dance of agency, but now concerning the self of the client. Some of the actors 
that emerged during the neurofeedback process - brain waves, computers, colored 
spots - , keep on working on the self of the client.
 Chapter four aims to better understand the emergence of these entities 
working on the self of the user. I analyze the lives and ideas of four central figures 
in the history of neurofeedback, and compose a historical ontology of the ‘extended 
self’. I show that the ‘discoverer of the human EEG’, the German psychiatrist 
and psychophysiologist Hans Berger (1873-1941), was driven by a personal and 
spiritual mission, but became increasingly frustrated about the complicated 
relationship between physical and psychical events. One of his followers, the British 
neurophysiologist and cyberneticist William Grey Walter (1910-1977), introduced 
the first brain wave stimulation technologies, and hence the first struggles between 
brains and subjects. Moreover, he connected brain waves to personality types 
by writing about brain brothers and strangers, and he entangled humans and 
machines by building robots with self-recognition and by describing the brain as an 
adaptive system. Two so-called ‘founding fathers of neurofeedback’, the American 
psychologists Joe Kamiya (1925) and Barry Sterman (1935), both performed 
experiments in which their subjects learned to train their brain at will, in order to 
become more spiritual,  or to improve one’s personality.
 The self was connected to the brain in the work of Berger, replaced by 
the brain in the work of Walter, and restored as an autonomous entity that could 
act upon the brain in the work of Kamiya and Sterman. In these developments, 
brain related entities were distinguished, material and spiritual ideas became 
entangled, human-machine connections arose, and a complicated relationship 
between the brain and the self emerged in which they started to control each 
other. Contemporary practitioners on the one hand state that neurofeedback gives 
control back to the client, but on the other hand use language that comes close to 
the terminology of Walter, for example, when talking about ‘low levels of dopamine 
walking into your door’. Moreover, in line with the ideas of neurofeedback 
pioneers, some contemporary practitioners combine their materialistic brain 
therapies with spiritual practices, such as meditation or yoga. 
 Using a device to understand, control, or cure the self by the brain changes 
people’s notion of their selves. Contemporary neurofeedback users – clients and 
practitioners – make a blend of technical, physiological, spiritual and personal 
statements to express themselves and how they deal with their problems. This 
‘new’ way of self is personal and unique, but it is also a result of a historical quest 
to grasp the (spiritual) self with a brain device. This dissertation argues that trying 
to explain or improve the self by working on the brain constitutes an extended 
way of being oneself. Since this argument might disagree with many individual and 
scientific experiences, I finish with a reflection on my explanation of the extended 
self. I conclude that this self is complex, not because it is an activity of multiple 
entities, but because it contradicts common understandings of being a self. If we 
want to slow down this process of extending, for example, because it makes the 
self increasingly complicated to understand, feel free about or responsible for, it is 
worthwhile to start making it visible.
